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Alvin Plantinga (Profiles, Vol. 5), ed. by James E. Tomberlin and Peter van 
Inwagen. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985. Pp. ix and 420. 
$55.00 (hardcover), $24 (paper). 
EDWARD WIERENGA, Center for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre 
Dame and University of Rochester. 
This is an excellent book. It begins with Plantinga's "Self-Profile," a 94-page 
personal and intellectual autobiography. Writing with characteristic wit, insight, 
and modesty, Plantinga describes first his upbringing and education, including 
in this section anecdotes of the famous Wayne State department and detailing 
the influence his association with Calvin College has had on his commitment to 
Christian scholarship. Next Plantinga surveys the range of philosophical issues 
on which he has written; these include the problem of evil, the Ontological 
Argument, Calvinist epistemology, proper names, necessity de dicta and de re, 
and the metaphysics of possible worlds. (Curiously, Plantinga does not mention 
here the analogical argument for other minds.) Plantinga describes the origin of 
some of his work, summarizes many of its leading ideas, makes a few concessions, 
and refines and elaborates several points. Included in this last category, for 
example, is an elegant new proof that there are worlds God cannot actualize. 
The next section of the book contains essays discussing different aspects of 
Plantinga's work contributed by nine distinguished philosophers. The first three 
deal with matters of modality. Peter van Inwagen deftly defends Plantinga's 
contention that there is no "problem of trans-world identity"-no problem 
associated with the same individual existing in more than one possible world-and 
he diagnoses some confusions that might have led some to think otherwise. 
Existentialism, at least as Plantinga uses the term, is the doctrine that haecceities 
(e.g., the property of being identical to Socrates) and singular propositions are 
ontologically dependent on the individuals they involve ("essence does not pre-
cede existence"), and actualism is the thesis that it is not possible that there are 
things that do not exist. (Plantinga rejects the former and accepts the latter.) In 
the course of examining Plantinga's treatment of possible worlds, John Pollock 
defends existentialism and argues against a version of actualism. Kit Fine endorses 
existentialism, too, but his main interest in his essay is to assess what he takes 
to be Plantinga's attempt to reduce possibilist discourse (claims about merely 
possible entities) to talk only of what is actual; Plantinga, however, eschews 
this program. 
In her essay Diana Ackerman raises objections to the theories of proper names 
(according to which names express essences) that Plantinga has proposed in [7] 
and [2]. Next, Carl Ginet discusses Plantinga's treatment of the analogical argu-
ment for other minds in [4], and he argues against a Cartesian argument Plantinga 
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presents in [7] that is supposed to allow anyone to show that he or she is not a 
material thing. 
The final four papers treat topics in the philosophy of religion. Robert Adams 
contributes a sensitive discussion of the problem of evil in both its logical and 
probabilistic forms. Adams contends that God does not have middle knowledge, 
or knowledge of what free creatures would do in various alternative cir-
cumstances, and he faults Plantinga's development of the free will defense for 
presupposing that God does have middle knowledge. James Tomberlin criticizes 
Plantinga's reasons for rejecting the Ontological Argument in [4], and he argues 
that the version of the argument that Plantinga holds in [7] to be sound does 
not, contrary to Plantinga's claim, show the rational acceptability of theism. 
Philip Quinn defends Plantinga's rejection (in [5]) of an argument for the conclu-
sion that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom which Nelson 
Pike ([1]) has defended. William Alston raises some questions about Plantinga's 
suggestion (in [6] and elsewhere) that belief in God is properly basic, and he 
offers some proposals of his own for regarding an epistemic practice (including 
the practice of accepting certain theistic beliefs as basic) to be reliable and, more 
importantly, justified. 
The final section of the book contains Plantinga's replies to these essays. 
There is much to be learned here, as Plantinga clarifies where he has been 
misunderstood, admits some mistakes, argues convincingly against his critics, 
and, often, advances the discussion of the issues. Of particular interest in this 
connection is his discussion of serious actualism (the doctrine that, necessarily, 
no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist). Two bibliographies 
are appended. The first is an annotated list of Plantinga's publications through 
1983. It omits an essay Ginet refers to ([3]), it does not include book reviews, 
and at least one of the works listed as forthcoming did not appear as announced. I 
The other bibliography lists by category discussions of Plantinga's work. 
In my critical comments, I shall focus on the role of incompatibilism in the 
Free Will Defense and on the exchange with Ackerman. A concession Plantinga 
makes in his "Self-Profile" (pp. 45-47; also the reply to Adams, pp. 371 f.) has 
to do with the presupposition of incompatibilism in his development of the Free 
Will Defense. In [7] Plantinga summarized the Free Will Defense as follows; 
A world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free (and 
freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else 
being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God 
can create free creatures, but he cannot cause or determine them to do 
only what is right. For if he does so, then they are not significantly free 
after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create people capable 
of moral good, therefore, he must create creatures capable of moral 
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evil; and he cannot leave these creatures free to perfonn evil and at the 
same time prevent them from doing so. God did in fact create signific-
antly free creatures; but some of them went wrong in the exercise of 
their freedom: this is the source of moral evil. (pp. 161 f.) 
(The subsequent presentation makes it clear that what the Free Will Defense 
requires is that this story be possible.) Plantinga went on to give a strongly 
incompatibilist account of freedom: ". . . a person is free with respect to an 
action A at a time t only if no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine 
either that he perfonns A att or that he refrains from so doing." ([7], p. 170-71) 
Now, however, Plantinga concedes that "if compatibilism is correct, the Free 
Will Defense fails" (p. 45). I believe that this concession is hasty. The point of 
introducing incompatibilism in the present context is that it helps establish the 
claim that God cannot cause or detennine his creatures to do only what is right. 
But this point remains on any plausible version of compatibilism. According to 
compatibilism, it's possible that all actions are both free and caused--(:aused, 
that is, by antecedent conditions and not by the agent himself. But not just any 
cause is compatible with an action's being free; free actions have to have the 
right kind of cause. Typically, compatibilists have held a theory of agency 
according to which it's a combination of the agent's beliefs and desires that 
constitutes the right kind of cause of an action for it to be free, and careful 
compatibilists add that these beliefs and desires must arise in the right way and 
lead to their effects in the right way. For suppose that Jones implants electrodes 
in Smith's brain and then intentionally manipulates them in a way that causes 
Smith to have a certain combination of beliefs and desires, a combination that 
causes Smith to perfonn action A. Clearly Smith doesn't do A freely. So if 
compatibilism isn't supplemented by a theory of agency that rules out cases like 
this in which someone is caused by another's manipulation to have the beliefs 
and desires that issue in action, compatibilism isn't even remotely plausible. 
Whatever condition rules out actions caused by beliefs and desires induced in 
this way by the manipUlation of electrodes should also rule out actions caused 
by God, whether that is by his implanting the relevant beliefs and desires or by 
some other method. Now the claim of the Free Will Defense that God "cannot 
cause or determine . .. [his free creatures] to do only what is right" needn't 
presuppose that for an action to be right, and hence, free, there can be no 
antecedent conditions and causal laws jointly sufficient for its occurrence; all 
that's required is that if God causes someone else's action to occur it's not a 
free action. But this constraint on free agency seems compatible with com-
patibilism. So even if (per incredlbile) compatibilism is correct, the Free Will 
Defense remains viable. 
In [7] Plantinga defended the view that proper names express essences and 
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that distinct names of the same object express the same essence. (An essence of 
a thing is a property which that thing could not fail to have and which nothing 
other than that thing could have.) Thus, 'Hesperus' and' Phosphorus' both express 
an essence of Venus, and 
(1) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus 
and 
(2) Phosphorus is identical with Phosphorus 
express the same proposition. How then to account for the ancient Babylonian 
astronomers who, prior to their discovery, believed (2) but not (l)? (Assume 
that the Babylonians spoke English.) The answer in [7] is that they did indeed 
believe the proposition expressed both by (1) and (2), but they did not realize 
that (1) expressed that proposition. Subsequently, Plantinga became dissatisfied 
with this rejoinder, and in [2] he proposed that distinct names of the same object 
can express (in a narrow sense) distinct and epistemically inequivalent essences 
of the object. On the "Boethian" view, then, the ancient Babylonians were right 
about their beliefs when they professed to believe (2) but not (1). Plantinga went 
on to suggest that the essences expressed by proper names are "a - transforms," 
where the a - transforms of a property P [(P "') ] is a property a thing has in a 
world W just in case that thing exists in Wand has P in a (the actual world). 
Perhaps, then, 'Thales' expresses the (entity referred to by ThaLes') a. In her 
contribution Diana Ackerman objects that although 
(3) Donnellan believes that the proposition that Thales is a Greek is 
identical with the proposition that Thales is a Greek, but it is false 
that Donnellan believes that the proposition that Thales is a Greek 
is identical with the proposition that the (entity referred to by 
'Thales') a is a Greek 
is true, replacing "the (entity referred to by 'Thales')"," by 'Thales' yields a 
contradiction. (p. 190) Hence, by a principle she calls the Propositional Attitude 
Principle (PAP), these terms do not, contrary to Plantinga's suggestion, express 
the same property. Plantinga's response (pp. 350-361) is to argue against (PAP). 
In particular, he claims that since questions of propositional identity are difficult, 
it is possible to be mistaken about whether one believes a proposition. In response 
to a subsequent objection, Plantinga claims that our grasp of propositions is often 
partial or dependent upon the language in which they are expressed, and he adds 
that "this is why Donnellan can be mistaken about what he believes." (p. 358) 
But this response cuts against the reason given for moving from the view presented 
in [7] to the Boethian view. Maybe the Babylonians were mistaken about what 
they believed; perhaps they had an imperfect grasp of the proposition expressed 
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by (1) and (2), or perhaps they did not recognize it when expressed by (1). 
Plantinga offers two considerations for favoring his Boethian view over the 
view in [7]: 
First, I think [the former] encounter[s] difficulty with empty proper 
names. How could an empty proper name express a haecceity, or any 
sort of essence? Clearly it couldn't express an exemplified essence. (If 
'Romulus', for example, expressed an exemplified essence, then the 
proposition expressed by 'Romulus does not exist' would be false rati1er 
than true.) And how could it possibly express an unexemplified haecceity 
or essence? Of course we could say that empty proper names function 
quite differently from non-empty proper names. But a more satisfying 
theory would have empty and non-empty proper names functioning in 
the same or closely similar ways. Here the Boethian view displays a 
certain charm; names in negative existentials, for example, resemble 
their colleagues in positive existentials in that in each case they express 
<X - transforms of singular properties-unexemplified in the first case 
and exemplified in the second. Second, the Boethian view allows a bit 
more flexibility, a little more latitude. If objects have epistemically 
inequivalent essences, why not take advantage of that fact in explaining 
the behavior of proper names? So I see the Boethian view as having 
these advantages. (p. 362) 
But I think that these alleged advantages are slender. Notice first that the Boethian 
view does not treat empty and non-empty names exactly analogously; for the 
leading idea of the Boethian view is that proper names express essences, but the 
a - transforms allegedly expressed by empty names are not essences. To see 
this it suffices to observe that since nothing in fact exemplifies, say, the (entity 
referred to by 'Romulus')", , nothing in any other possible world exemplifies it, 
either. For in order for something in a world W to exemplify this property, it 
must exist in Wand be referred to by 'Romulus' in a; but nothing is referred 
to by 'Romulus' in <x. So being the (entity referred to by 'Romulus')(X is not a 
property that it is possible that something have essentially and not possible that 
any other thing have at all, since it is not so much as possible that anything have 
this property. So the Boethian view treats empty and non-empty names alike 
only to the extent that it holds that they both express <X - transforms, not that 
they both express essences. More importantly, this view seems to have some 
counter-intuitive consequences, namely, that all empty names express properties 
that are logically equivalent to each other (since they are all impossible), and 
such sentences as 
(1) Romulus founded Rome 
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express propositions that are logically impossible. Plantinga's other consideration 
in favor of the Boethian view over his earlier view is that appealing to epistem-
ically inequivalent essences allows for greater flexibility. But Plantinga's assump-
tions that we can be mistaken about whether we believe a proposition, that we 
can grasp propositions imperfectly, and that they are mediated by the sentences 
that express them would seem already to yield the flexibility Plantinga values; 
whenever the Boethian theory says that two names (or tokens of the same name) 
express different essences of an object, the alternative theory can say that the 
same essence is mediated by different names (or tokens).2 
NOTES 
I. Readers expecting to find "Dlaczego sie wspinamy?," the Polish translation of [8], should recall 
that it did not appear until after 1983. 
2. I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga, whose comments on an earlier draft of this review resulted in 
the excision of some egregious galimatias. 
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